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IFRS Mandatory disclosures in Malaysia: the influence of family control and the value 
(ir)relevance of compliance levels  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
We examine the effect of family control on IFRS mandatory disclosure levels, and the 
valuation implications of these disclosure levels, for Malaysian companies. We find that 
family control is related negatively to disclosure and that compliance levels are not value 
relevant. These findings suggest that agency theory predictions and theories linking common 
law legal systems to high quality financial reporting require refining in certain national 
contexts. Where Type 2 agency problems dominate, institutional arrangements intended to 
enhance financial reporting quality aimed at mitigating Type 1 problems in developed 
markets may have limited effect in less developed jurisdictions. 
 
 
Keywords: Compliance, Corporate governance, Culture, Family control, IFRS, Malaysia, 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is motivated by a lack of research on mandatory financial reporting disclosures 
and by calls for research on the valuation implications of such disclosures (cf. Hassan et al., 
2009; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Schipper, 2007). It examines the effect of family control on 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) mandated disclosures, which has not 
previously been examined, and the value relevance of disclosure levels, in the unique 
Malaysian institutional and cultural environment. In Malaysia the unusual combination of 
politics dominated by Malays and business dominated by Chinese results in a unique research 
setting which differs from other Asian countries (Hasnan et al., 2013; see also Lim et al., 
2014). While the Malaysian setting has been explored in some earlier studies on corporate 
reporting practices (see below), compliance with mandatory IFRS disclosure requirements 
has not previously been examined. Thus, by contributing a specific country case study, we 
‘recognise and discuss the country specific context rather than set it to one side or assume it 
does not exist’ (Weetman, 2006, p. 364). This permits us to control for institutional and 
political factors which affect corporate reporting and investor behaviour (Ruland et al., 2007). 
It also permits us to test assumptions and explanation potentials of disclosure and valuation 
theories in a distinctive context, and alert researchers to their limitations. Our study is 
however also relevant beyond the Malaysian setting, and our discussion and conclusions will 
also be relevant for other settings where macro-economic political measures interact with 
cultural factors and affect or override market mechanisms.  
Malaysia has fully converged its national accounting standards with IFRS and has a large 
proportion of family controlled firms. We measure compliance with the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of 12 accounting standards, which are identical to IFRS, for a sample of 221 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia as at 31 December 2008. Controlling for corporate 
governance and other firm characteristics, we (i) test whether mandatory disclosure levels are 
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determined by family control and (ii) examine the relationship between compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements and firm value across family and non-family firms.  
We find that compliance with disclosure requirements is incomplete. This supports 
findings of prior literature suggesting poor quality financial reporting, lack of transparency 
and an ineffective regulatory system in Malaysia (e.g. Ball et al., 2003). Problems of 
compliance are particularly evident in the case of IFRS disclosures involving high proprietary 
costs. There is robust evidence of a significant and negative relationship between family 
control and IFRS disclosure levels. This is to be expected where, as in a Malaysian context, 
family firms dominate, and predominantly Type 2 agency problems arise (see section 3.2).  
We also find statistically significant evidence linking better compliance to higher quality 
corporate governance. The corporate governance characteristics which appear significant 
vary between family and non-family firms. 
We find no evidence that disclosure levels are related significantly to firm value. This 
supports Ball et al. (2003), who suggest that the dominance of family ownership in East Asia 
reduces demand for public reporting; information asymmetry is instead resolved by private 
communication channels. Therefore compliance with disclosure requirements does not affect 
market values. This suggests a lack of support for efficiency based theories which argue that 
high quality financial reporting acts as a mechanism to compensate for weak investor 
protection and insider trading in emerging capital markets (cf. Leventis and Weetman, 2004). 
Instead, we find a significant and negative relationship between firms with family controlled 
boards and firm value. Our findings can also be interpreted in the context of culture theory. 
Differences in how collectivism is enacted within the two largest ethnic groups - Bumiputera 
(Malays) and Chinese - provide explanations for differences in disclosure levels between 
family and non-family firms, since the former are dominated by ethnic Chinese.  
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Our study is relevant to regulators, standard setters and investors concerned with the 
implications of (non-)compliance with disclosure requirements (Schipper, 2007; IASB, 
2013). Strong institutional arrangements, including high quality accounting standards and 
corporate governance guidelines, contribute to higher quality financial reporting. Their 
effectiveness, however, is subject to economic environments, (business) culture, market 
structure and corporate control. In developing economies such as Malaysia, where Type 2 
Agency problems dominate, solutions created to mitigate the Type 1 problems faced by more 
developed markets, may only have limited effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the financial 
reporting environment in Malaysia. Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework of the 
study and the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data employed and the research 
design. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Financial Reporting Environment in Malaysia 
We now briefly introduce Malaysia’s financial reporting environment. Other features of the 
Malaysian context, such as ownership structures, will be discussed below, within the 
hypothesis development and research design sections. 
Malaysia’s institutional structure, including the common law legal system, the taxation 
and accounting systems and company law have been introduced or influenced by British 
colonisation (Roubi & Richardson, 1998). However, the reporting environment also shares 
features with code law countries: the importance of banks as capital providers (Ball et al., 
2003; Suto, 2003; Zhuang et al., 2000), high ownership concentration, insider governance,1 
weak investor protection and enforcement, and strong government intervention in the 
                                                 
1Insider governance systems are those where firms are predominantly owned and controlled by inside 
shareholders (often family members). They are characterised by limited separation of ownership and control and 
thus have only limited Type 1 agency problems (see e.g. Solomon, 2010, p. 194-196). 
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economy (Hasnan et al., 2013; Suto, 2003; Tam & Tan, 2007; Zhuang et al., 2000) (see also 
note 6). Malaysian financial reporting has therefore been criticised as being of low quality. 
Audit quality may also be compromised, since there are fewer incentives for auditors to 
maintain independence (Ball et al., 2003; Fevere-Marchesi, 2000). Also, Hasnan et al. (2013) 
suggest that Malaysian auditors seem to be unable to effectively screen clients for earnings 
management. 
Public listed companies are required to comply with accounting standards, the 
Companies Act, the Securities Commission guidelines, Bursa listing requirement and the 
Income Tax Act (Tan, 2000). Accounting standards are issued by the Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board (MASB), whose activities and operations are overseen by the Financial 
Reporting Foundation (FRF). Both the FRF and the MASB were established in 1997.2 
Malaysia followed a distinct approach in reaction to the Asian financial crisis (1997-8). It 
was the only country which, rather than relying on improved transparency through 
accounting and audit reforms, introduced radical macro-economic reorganisation, including 
temporary capital controls (Arnold, 2012). Corporate governance was reformed through 
government initiatives (Liew, 2007) and state ownership of companies was expanded (Nik 
Ahmad, 2008). This reflects the strong involvement of the government in the economy, and 
may explain why accounting reforms, including IFRS implementation, were not prioritized 
(as in other institutional settings), and why their effective enforcement does not appear to be a 
priority.  
Convergence with IFRS was implemented in several phases. In January 2005, the MASB 
standards were renamed Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) and their numbering changed 
to correspond to that of IFRS (Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), 2005). The FRSs 
then comprised 21 new and 17 revised standards, which became effective on 1 January 2006. 
                                                 
2Source: www.masb.org.my (12/12/2008). 
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Their content largely matched that of the corresponding IFRS; for 12 standards, it was 
identical. This caused changes in recognition, measurement and disclosures, and required 
effort at the implementation stage (Deloitte, 2006). Malaysia aimed for full convergence of 
its remaining standards with IFRS by 1 January 2012. The Malaysian FRSs (MFRS) since 
issued by the MASB are identical to IFRS in all respects other than nomenclature.  
Two bodies monitor financial reporting quality: the Financial Reporting and Corporate 
Surveillance Department (a department of the Securities Commission (SC)) and the Financial 
Statement Review Committee of MIA. However, research suggests that enforcement is weak 
(e.g. Ball et al., 2003; Liew, 2007; Tam & Tan, 2007; Zhuang et al., 2000). The Surveillance 
Department’s effect is limited: between 2002 and 2009 only five companies were 
reprimanded for a breach of accounting regulation (SC, 20103); however 76 companies 
(against some 1,000 listed firms) were investigated for fraud between 1996 and 2007 (Hasnan 
et al., 2013).  
The MIA’s Review Committee only reviews a small number of cases (approximately 30 
per year). In spite of this, a significant number of cases of non-compliance with accounting 
requirements are identified.4 This also indicates that non-compliance is a problem. Finally, 
while in principle possible media attention can incentivise companies to disclose corporate 
information (Adams, 2002), this appears not to have affected IFRS implementation in 
Malaysia. This may be the case because such media coverage has been limited (Lopez, 2010).  
In summary, in spite of the common law legal framework and British colonial influence 
on accounting, the Malaysian environment leads us to expect incomplete compliance with 
disclosure requirements. This, and the prevalence of family ownership, motivate our 
exploration of the role of family control on mandatory disclosure levels, and of the effect of 
                                                 
3 SC Enforcement Press Releases, available at http://www.sc.com.my 
4 For example, 2012: 4 cases; 2011: 3 cases; 2010: 6 cases; 2009, 2 cases 
(http://www.mia.org.my/new/surveillance). However, the MIA does not identify the companies, directors or 
auditors in question. 
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disclosure levels on firm valuation across family and non-family controlled companies. The 
theoretical underpinnings of these explorations are presented in the next section. 
 
3. Theory and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Mandatory vs. voluntary disclosures 
Corporate disclosure aids decision making (Beaver, 1978). Voluntary disclosure is ‘any 
disclosure by companies not mandated by law and/or self-regulatory bodies’ (Owusu-Ansah, 
1998, p. 154). Mandatory disclosure is the minimum information which promulgated 
regulation requires from a reporting entity. The level and quality of voluntary disclosures is 
the result of the rational decisions of managers, based on perceived costs and benefits (Gray 
et al., 1990). These arise from the preparation and dissemination of (positive or negative) 
information. This leaves considerable room for discretion. For mandatory disclosures, 
however, the existence of a standardised framework of promulgated regulation should result 
in comparable information across companies. It also suggests that failure to publish 
mandatory information can be easily identified. Mandatory disclosures increase transparency 
by providing insight into accounting policies and underlying assumptions (cf. Pownall & 
Schipper, 1999). This may reduce economic uncertainty (Anctil et al. 2004; Hope, 2003). 
Unlike voluntary disclosures, mandatory disclosures force companies to ‘talk about current 
cash flows, profits, net assets and ownership claims rather than firms’ aspirations for future 
success’ (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008, p. 68). Thus, they compel companies to make public both 
proprietary and non-proprietary information (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008) and both ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ news (Verrecchia, 2001).  
However, if enforcement is inefficient, the levels of mandatory disclosures provided are, 
like voluntary disclosures, heavily dependent on managers’ decisions. Thus, cost 
considerations arising from the preparation and dissemination of positive or negative 
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information that influence the provision of voluntary disclosures can also apply, to some 
extent, to mandatory disclosures. Nevertheless, there is an additional element of cost/benefit 
that managers assess when determining the level of mandatory disclosures they provide: that 
of ‘regulatory risk’ (which consists of, inter alia, financial risk, litigation risk, risk of 
regulatory engagement and reputation risk (Adams, 1994, p. 279). Researchers therefore not 
only measure actual compliance with disclosure requirements, but also examine attitudes 
towards compliance, i.e. companies’ ‘compliance culture’ (Jenkinson, 1996).  
The board of directors is the central internal control mechanism for monitoring managers 
(Fama, 1980). It has ultimate responsibility for the preparation of financial statements that 
comply with regulation and ‘present fairly the financial position, financial performance and 
cash flows of an entity’ (IAS 1.15; FRS 101.15). Its ability to act as an effective control 
mechanism depends on its independence from management (Beasley, 1996), on board 
composition and on incentives. We control for these corporate governance and other firm 
characteristics in our examination of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements, its 
determinants and the potential valuation implications of mandatory disclosures. We 
investigate these issues by testing two hypotheses developed below. 
 
3.2 Family control: Influence on mandatory disclosures  
The extant literature commonly articulates the effect of ownership concentration on 
(voluntary) disclosure (see e.g. Ali et al., 2007; Jaggi et al., 2009) and firm value (see e.g. 
Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) in terms of Type 1 or Type 2 agency 
problems. Type 1 problems are concerned with conflict between managers and shareholders 
and may be described as ‘manager opportunism’ or the ‘misalignment effect’ (Wan-Hussin, 
2009). In firms with widely dispersed ownership, information asymmetry favours 
management rather than external shareholders. Management can withhold information or use 
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the firms’ resources in its own, rather than the shareholders’ (principals’) interest (moral 
hazard). This problem is reduced in family firms, because the separation between ownership 
and control is reduced or non-existent. Major shareholders (families) are able to directly 
monitor managers (e.g. Ali et al. 2007; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). 
However, high concentration of ownership in the hands of family members can lead to 
Type 2 agency problems, also known as ‘owner opportunism’ or the ‘entrenchment effect’. In 
such firms, boards of directors tend to be dominated by family members. This may result in 
less independent directors (Ali et al., 2007 with reference to Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 2004). 
Family control may allow for the ‘transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of 
those who control them’ (i.e., ‘tunnelling’; Johnson et al., 2000, p. 22), for example, through 
related party transactions (Ali et al., 2007)). This is because ‘family owners often have 
significant businesses outside the firm, which provide them with a means to divert the firm’s 
resources’ (Lim et al., 2014, p. 34, with reference to Atanasov et al., 2008). This problem can 
increase with the proportion of family members on boards (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Miller 
et al., 2007). Thus, family firms may be beneficial for the controlling families, at the expense 
of minority shareholders. Family firms also have incentives to conceal unfavourable 
information and to manipulate earnings. Thus, family owners ‘can tilt firms’ disclosure 
toward their preferences’ (Chen et al., 2008, p. 501).  
These theoretical foundations are particularly relevant for our study. Family companies 
are dominant in Malaysia (Tam & Tan, 2007). For example, 67.2% of Malaysian firms in 
1996 were family controlled and 85% of these were managed by owner managers or 
managers related to the controlling family (Claessens et al., 1999). Claessens et al. (1999) add 
that 39.3% and 14.9% of firms were characterised by pyramid and cross ownership structures 
respectively and that a quarter of the corporate sector in Malaysia is controlled by the ten 
largest families. Minority shareholders tend not to engage in decision making (Lopez, 2010), 
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probably because of weak participation mechanisms and a lack of incentives (Zhuang et al., 
2000; see also Fry, 2009). In contrast with other common law countries, investors’ legal 
rights are not effectively enforced (Zhuang et al., 2000). These features suggest that the 
greater the number of family members on companies’ boards, the higher the family’s ability 
to extract benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (cf. Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; 
Miller et al., 2007). 
Theory also suggests a link between culture and disclosure levels. In Malaysia, the two 
largest ethnic groups are the majority indigenous Bumiputera (Malays) and Malaysian 
Chinese. Many family firms in Malaysia are owned and controlled by Malaysian Chinese, 
reflecting the significance of family in traditional Chinese culture (Ball et al., 2003). 
Malaysian Chinese maintain their Chinese culture and are less acculturated than Chinese in 
neighbouring countries (Freedman, 2001). Although Malays and Malaysian Chinese have 
some similar cultural attributes, there are also fundamental differences that require separate 
classification (Lim, 1998). While both are high in Power Distance, in Malay society, 
authority rests with political power (e.g. the territorial chief or the Sultan), whereas in 
Chinese society, it rests with the family patriarch, owner and manager of the family business. 
Both cultures are high in Collectivism, but while Collectivism in Malay society is strongly 
influenced by Islamic values and reflected, inter alia, in a strong sense of responsibility 
towards society (Baydoun & Willet, 2000), collectivism in Malaysian Chinese culture is 
manifest in guanxi or social networking, associations and guilds linked with the business 
community (Lim, 1998). Guanxi prescribes implicit mutual obligation, assurance, trust and 
understanding among the members of a group, and failure to meet guanxi responsibilities 
results in damaged prestige, loss of face and loss of trust (Hwang et al., 2009). The Malaysian 
Chinese can also be more individualistic at national level. Haniffa (1999) suggests that this is 
because they are non-indigenous people and because the Malaysian state discriminates in 
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favour of indigenous Malay. As a result, Malaysian Chinese are likely to feel less loyalty 
towards the country.5 This means that Collectivism for Malaysian Chinese is restricted to the 
Chinese society, family or guanxi network. Thus, Ball et al. (2003) find that the prevalence of 
family controlled businesses and guanxi networks in East Asia (including Malaysia) reduces 
the demand for public disclosure. In Malaysia, however, the unusual combination of politics 
dominated by Malays and business dominated by Chinese results in a unique research setting 
which differs from other Asian countries (Hasnan et al., 2013; see also Lim et al., 2014). 
For the purposes of our study, the combination of the above characteristics can lead to 
family control having considerable influence on the levels of mandatory disclosure. In 
general, the preparation of the financial statements is delegated to lower levels of 
management, the board will review and influence decisions on reporting and disclosure 
levels.6 The board will assess the risks involved in providing or withholding specific 
proprietary or non-proprietary information through mandatory disclosures (see above). As 
argued above, family members in management positions and with board seats can lead to 
ineffective monitoring and poor governance, which is associated with low quality financial 
reporting. This also applies in Malaysia (see e.g. Hasnan et al., 2013; also Lim et al., 2014). 
On the other hand, family members may wish to protect family reputation for the benefit of 
future generations, which may reduce incentives for earnings management (ibid., with 
reference to Wang, 2006; also Lim et al., 2014). However, if the family lacks board 
representation, family firms (in Asian countries in particular) will face agency-problems 
                                                 
5Because of their influence in economic affairs, the Malaysian Chinese had been perceived as a political threat 
to Malays (Freedman, 2001). Following racial riots in 1969, the government implemented a ‘New Economic 
Policy’ (NEP) in 1971 (Ismail, 2000). This was intended to eradicate poverty and eliminate racial identification 
from economic functions (Ismail, 2000). In effect, the government pursued economic policies in favour of 
Bumiputeras (Gomez, 1999), aiming to increase Bumiputera equity ownership (Norhashim & Aziz, 2005); when 
this proved difficult, it used state enterprises to accumulate assets for the benefit of Bumiputera (Jesudason, 
1990). It also established state owned banks to provide loans to Bumiputera entrepreneurs (Jesudason, 1990). 
6 This is supported by the findings of Holland (2006) in a UK context. 
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similar to other companies with large block holders (Andres, 2008). Board representation is 
therefore indicative of family control and pertinent to our study.  
Based on the above discussion, we argue that Type 2 agency problems affect compliance 
with disclosure requirements (as a feature of poor financial reporting quality). Prior literature 
in the Malaysian setting has so far only examined the effect of ownership and other 
governance characteristics on voluntary disclosure (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke (2002) and Mohd 
Ghazali & Weetman (2006)) which, as argued above, differs from mandatory disclosure with 
regard to content, format, extent and motivation. Among other recent studies with family 
ownership or control as explanatory variables in a Malaysian setting, Hasnan et al. (2013) 
explore motivations and opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting and Lim et al. (2014) 
the timeliness of earnings. Wan-Hussin (2009) studies the impact of family control on the 
voluntary early implementation of a standard introducing mandatory segmental disclosures 
but does not examine actual compliance levels with the standard’s disclosures requirements. 
There is, thus, no prior study on the role of family control in compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements in Malaysia. We therefore contribute to the relevant disclosure and 
corporate governance literature by formulating and testing the following directional 
hypothesis: 
H1: There is a significant and negative relationship between mandatory disclosure levels and 
family control in Malaysia. 
  
3.3 Disclosure levels and firm value 
Theory suggests that disclosure reduces information asymmetry and thus adverse selection 
costs (Verrecchia 2001). Increased disclosure therefore improves stock market liquidity 
(Baiman & Verrecchia 1996; Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Kim & Verrecchia 1994). 
Securities for which less information is available, on the other hand, carry a higher risk 
because of greater uncertainty relating to their return distribution (Barry & Brown 1984; 
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Brown 1979; Clarkson et al. 1996; Coles et al. 1995). Therefore, higher disclosure levels may 
reduce estimation risk and, assuming market efficiency, firms’ cost of capital.  
A firm’s financial statements should portray information relevant to the assessment of its 
economic position (see e.g. Barth & Schipper, 2007). Notes to the accounts form an integral 
part of the financial statements, including ‘a summary of significant accounting policies and 
other explanatory information’ (IAS1.10). However, existing research on the value relevance 
of accounting information focuses primarily on items recognised in the financial statements. 
The relevance of the supporting disclosures for financial statement users therefore remains 
under-researched (Hassan et al., 2009; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Schipper, 2007; Tsalavoutas 
& Dionysiou, 2014).  
Mandatory disclosures concerning accounting policies permit financial statement users to 
infer information about underlying accounting practices (Dye, 1985), and thus about firms’ 
private (‘proprietary’) information. For example, Hope (2003) finds that accounting policy 
disclosures are important to analysts, are more useful than other annual report disclosures, 
and can reduce uncertainty about forecasted earnings. Mandatory IFRS disclosures which 
provide potentially value relevant information to investors relate, inter alia, to risks affecting 
business and geographical segments, to assumptions and predictions regarding impairment 
testing, to share options, business combinations, actuarial assumptions and assumptions 
regarding credit risk exposure (Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 2014).  
Prior research suggests a positive relationship between disclosure levels and firm value; 
its focus, however, with the exception of Hassan et al. (2009) and Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou 
(2014), is either on voluntary disclosures (e.g., Al-Akra & Ali, 2012) or governance related 
disclosures (e.g., Goncharov et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012). Given the paucity of evidence on 
the potential relationship between firm value and mandatory disclosures, the expected sign of 
the relationship is unclear (Bushee & Leuz, 2005). It is also unclear because mandatory 
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disclosure requirements demand the disclosure of good and bad news. High levels of 
compliance, therefore, may have a positive effect on some firms’ value but a negative effect 
on the value of others.  
Malaysia’s capital market is immature; it is classified as an advanced emerging market 
(FTSE, 2012) with low liquidity and thin trading (Tam & Tan, 2007; Zhuang et al., 2000). 
Leventis & Weetman (2004, with reference to Owusu-Ansah (2000)) state that, in emerging 
markets, informative and timely financial reporting may mitigate against weak investor 
protection and insider trading. One would expect, therefore, that financial statements and 
mandatory disclosures should provide value relevant information to market participants in 
Malaysia. However, Ball et al. (2003) argue that high ownership concentration, insider 
governance and close relationships between firms and banks in Malaysia result in a reduction 
in the demand for public financial reporting, since information asymmetry is resolved 
through private communication channels. These contrasting perspectives and Malaysia’s 
move towards a reporting regime with more rigorous mandatory disclosure requirements 
indicate a need to explore the value relevance of mandatory disclosures in Malaysia. We 
formulate the following non-directional hypothesis. 
H2: There is a significant relationship between companies’ levels of compliance with IFRS 
mandatory disclosure requirements and firm value in Malaysia. 
 
4. Methods and sample selection 
4.1 Data  
The Malaysian government announced convergence with IFRS in 2005. The first converged 
standards were enacted in 2006. To avoid noise from first time-implementation problems, we 
test our hypotheses for firms’ financial years ending within the 2008 calendar year.  
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As at 31 December 2008, 977 companies were listed on the Bursa Malaysia with total 
market capitalisation of RM 664 billion7 (634 companies were listed on the Main Board, 221 
listed on the Second Board and 122 on the (then) Mesdaq Market (EPU, 2009)). We chose 
sample firms only from the Main Board because they are more established and more exposed 
to the public eye than firms on the secondary markets. We excluded 41 financial companies 
because they are subject to different regulation and under close supervision from the Central 
Bank. A further 142 firms were excluded because they had not published annual reports at the 
time our data was collected. The remaining 451 companies were divided into three categories 
according to size (based on total assets). Then 50% of companies were selected randomly 
from each strata (category). This provided a sufficiently large, and more representative 
population than would have resulted from an exclusive concentration on large companies. 
From our sample of 225 companies we excluded a further four with negative book value of 
equity. For our sample companies, we acquired all data (the 2008 financial statements and 
accompanying notes, financial and market related raw data) from the Bursa Malaysia. Table 1 
summarises the steps followed during the sample selection process. 
TABLE 1 – ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Identification and definition of family control 
To identify the ownership holding and family relationship of directors, we collected data 
from the ‘top 30 largest shareholders’ section of annual reports. The Bursa Listing 
Requirements (paragraph 9.19 (25) and 9.25) require disclosure of the identity of 
shareholders holding e  five per cent of equity shares and of any family relationships8 among 
directors and between directors and major shareholders.  
                                                 
7Equals to £132.8 billion (Exchange rate as at 31 December 2008: £1=RM4.9989). 
8 The Companies Act 1965 (section 122A) defines family members of directors as the spouse, parent, child, 
brother, sister and spouse of such child, brother or sister. We identify family members from disclosures made in 
annual reports or by tracing family names (Chinese surnames or Muslim patronymics) in the Analysis of 
substantial shareholders in the annual report. 
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To test H1 we follow prior studies which have examined the effect of the board, and in 
particular family representation on the board, on disclosure. We choose the percentage of 
family related board members as the most appropriate measure of family control (e.g., 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Mohd-Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Wan-Hussin, 2009). We use this 
measure as a continuous variable.  
Subsequently, we partition our sample across firms with and without ‘family controlled 
boards’ (Jaggi et al. 2009: 287). The former are firms with two or more members of the same 
family on the board of directors. We refer to the former as family firms and the latter as non-
family firms. Partitioning the sample in this way allows us to conduct additional exploratory 
tests to identify any differences in the determinants of mandatory disclosures where a family 
clearly has a strong presence on the board and can therefore exercise significant influence, 
and where this is not the case.  
When testing the relationship between mandatory disclosure levels and firm value (i.e., 
to test H2), we introduce a dummy variable (FamContF), where 1 represents family firms and 
0 non-family firms as an additional control variable in our empirical model.  
 
4.3 Measuring compliance with disclosure requirements 
To measure compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements, a disclosure checklist was 
created. This was derived from the disclosure requirements of 12 accounting standards, which 
were chosen on the basis of the following criteria: 1) They were enacted in 2006 and were 
identical to IFRS; 2) eight of these standards9 caused a major impact on recognition, 
measurement and disclosures, thus requiring considerable effort at the implementation stage 
                                                 
9 FRS2 Share Based Payment, FRS3 Business Combinations, FRS 5 Non-current Assets held for Sale and 
Discontinued Operations, FRS 117 Leases, FRS 132 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, FRS 
136 Impairment of Assets, FRS 138 Intangible Assets and FRS 140 Investment Property. 
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(Deloitte, 2006); and 3) non-compliance with the remaining four standards10 had previously 
been noted as a particular problem by the Financial Statements Review Committee (MIA, 
2007). 
To ensure the content validity11 of the research instrument, our disclosure checklist was 
reviewed by an independent IFRS expert.12 The final disclosure checklist consisted of 295 
index items. To ensure the reliability of the research instrument,13 the authors and the 
independent expert scored 12 randomly selected companies. Items were scored as 1 if 
disclosed, as 0 if undisclosed, and as ‘not applicable’, if they were not relevant to the 
circumstances of a company (Cooke, 1992). On comparing the researchers’ findings, 
differences in compliance scores across investigators were found to be not significant.  
All sample companies were then scored against the disclosure checklist. We employed two 
disclosure index methods, the ‘partial compliance (PC) unweighted method’ (hereafter, the 
PC Method) and the ‘unweighted disclosure index method’ (hereafter, Cooke’s Method). The 
PC Method is based on the assumption that each standard is of equal importance and should 
have equal weight, i.e.: 
      (Eq. 1) 
In the case of each company, a compliance score (disclosure index) is calculated for each 
standard separately (Xi). The scores for all standards are then added and divided by the total 
                                                 
10 FRS 101 Presentation of Financial Statements, FRS 114 Segmental Reporting, FRS 116 Property, Plant and 
Equipment and FRS 119 Employee Benefits. 
11Content validity refers to whether the research instrument ‘adequately measures the concept of interest’ 
(Vlachos, 2001, p. 184 with reference to Sekaran, 1992); that is, in our case, whether it adequately measures 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. Content validity is established by subject experts, who 
evaluate the items which are supposed to measure the concept (Kidder & Judd, 1986). 
12 This independent researcher is a senior financial accounting and reporting analyst, with more than 13 years 
experience in the field at the time the analysis took place. Prior to this, he was employed in the banking industry 
for more than 20 years.  
13 Reliability is concerned with how well the concept under investigation is being measured, i.e. the degree of 
precision, stability (i.e. irrespective of time and conditions) and consistency of measurement (see for example 
Vlachos, 2001). 
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number of applicable standards for the company j i.e. Rj, resulting in the total compliance 
score for each company, PCj. This can range between 0 and 1.  
We also applied Cooke’s Method.14 Here the index Cj is calculated as the ratio of the 
total number (T) of items disclosed (di) by company j to the maximum possible number of 
disclosure items (M) for that company:  
      (Eq. 2) 
Compliance scores computed under the PC and Cooke’s methods tend to be statistically 
different and significantly associated with different independent variables (corporate 
characteristics) (Street & Gray, 2001; Tsalavoutas et al., 2010; Tsalavoutas, 2011). We 
therefore consider findings as valid only where the determinants of (non-) compliance are 
significant under both methods. This allows us to conclude that mandatory disclosure levels 
are adequately captured. 
 
4.4 The models employed 
To test H1, we employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), where the dependent variable is the 
compliance/disclosure score. The independent variable Family is our proxy for family 
control. We also employ various control variables which, according to the prior empirical 
research referred to below, have a statistically significant impact on mandatory disclosures.15 
The following model is employed:  
                                                 
14Because Cooke’s method gives equal weight to each item, a standard that has more disclosure items may 
appear to be more important than a standard with fewer disclosure items. Given that the PC method gives each 
standard equal weighting it ‘avoids the problem of unintentionally giving more weight to a standard with a large 
number of items in the index’ (Al-Shiab, 2003, p.223). 
15 Some of these variables have also been identified as significant determinants of voluntary disclosures (e.g., 
Botosan, 1997; Lang & Lundholm, 1993). 
∑
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(Eq. 3) 
where CSj is the compliance score (measured by the PC method or Cooke’s method); Familyj 
is the percentage of family members on the board; Ind_dirj is the percentage of independent 
directors on the board (e.g., Al-Akra et al., 2010);16 BSj is the number of individuals on the 
board (e.g., Al-Akra et al., 2010); ACExj denotes the percentage of board members with an 
accounting background on the audit committee (e.g., Kent & Stewart, 2008) (i.e. who have a 
degree in accounting and/or in finance or a professional accounting qualification); ACSj is the 
number of individuals on the audit committee (e.g., Mangena & Pike, 2005); ACMj is the 
number of meetings the audit committee held during the year (e.g., Kent & Stewart, 2008); 
BExj denotes the percentage of board members with an accounting background (captured as 
indicated above); BMj is the number of board meetings held during the year (e.g., Kent & 
Stewart, 2008); Ind_dir_ACj is the percentage of independent directors on the audit 
committee (e.g., Kent & Stewart, 2008); DUALj is a dummy variable with 1 indicating a CEO 
serving also as Chairman (e.g., Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) and 0 a segregation of these duties; 
Industryj is a dummy variable where 1 represents manufacturing companies and 0 other 
companies (e.g., Tsalavoutas, 2011); Audj is a dummy variable where 1 represents companies 
with a ‘Big 4’ auditor and 0 otherwise (e.g., Tsalavoutas, 2011); ROEj is the ratio of net 
income to total shareholders’ equity (e.g., Hassan et al., 2006); Liqj is the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities (e.g., Wallace & Naser, 1995); Sizej is the natural logarithm of 
total sales (e.g., Hassan et al., 2006); Levj is the ratio of total liabilities to total shareholders’ 
equity (e.g., Patton & Zelenka, 1997); and µj is the mean zero disturbance term. 
                                                 
16 The Bursa Malaysia describes an independent director as a ‘director who is independent of management and 
free from any business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgement, 
where he/she is not an executive director or major shareholder of the company or someone related to any 
executive director, officer or major shareholder of the company’ (Bursa Listing Requirements, Practice Note 13, 
paragraph 1.1.). This is self-declared by companies and this is what we have captured. 
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Two potential problems may arise as a result of using the actual disclosure score as a 
dependent variable in a regression model. First, because the dependent variable lies between 
0 and 1 (i.e. ‘bounded’, Cooke, 1998), the model may produce predictions of probabilities 
greater than 1 (Al-Shiab, 2003). Second, the classical OLS regression assumes that the 
dependent variable is normally distributed; because the compliance score may not be 
normally distributed this assumption is violated. To limit these problems, as an alternative to 
using the actual disclosure score as the dependent variable, we also use the log of the odds 
ratio, following Cooke’s (1998) recommendations (e.g., Al-Shammari et al., 2008). This is 
computed as follows: 
   Y =log ( )     (Eq. 4) 
where Y = the transformed level of compliance and p = the ratio of companies’ compliance 
computed by the disclosure methods described above. This is applied to both PC and Cooke’s 
methods.  
In developing H1 above, we discuss also the unique features of the Malaysian 
environment with regard to the prevalence of specific ethnic groups and their effects on 
family control and corporate disclosure levels. To permit us to reflect on this and enrich the 
discussion of our findings below, we also collect information about board members’ 
ownership share, culture and whether they are family members as defined in notes 8 and 22. 
We construct the following variables: Malay (the percentage of board members of Malay 
ethnic origin); CEO_Fam (a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the CEO is a family 
member); Chair_Chin (a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the Chairman is of Chinese 
ethnic origin; CEO_Chin (a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the CEO is of Chinese 
ethnic origin); ChinOwn (a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the ultimate owner is of 
Chinese ethnic origin); BumiOwn is a dummy variable with 1 indicating that the ultimate 
owner is of Bumiputera ethnic origin).  
p
p
−1
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To determine ultimate ownership in our sample firms, we also follow Jaggi et al. (2009: 
288) and use a threshold of 20 per cent of equity shares owned (directly or indirectly) by one 
shareholder. If two or more shareholders met this criterion, ultimate ownership status was 
assigned to the shareholder with the largest equity holding. Where the ultimate owners were 
nominee or private companies, we sourced information from newspapers, business 
magazines, journals, Bursa publications and the internet to identify the ultimate owners of 
these nominee or private companies. Based on this process, we construct the following 
dummy variables: FamOwn where 1 indicates that the ultimate owner is a family, StatOwn 
where 1 indicates that the ultimate owner is the state and OthOwn where 1 indicates that the 
ultimate owner is either a foreign investor or that the firm is widely held. To identify family 
owned companies (FamOwn), we added the portions of shares owned by all family members 
of the respective company.17 We report descriptive statistics with regard to these variables in 
Tables 2 and 4. 
To test H2, we also apply OLS regressions and we employ the following regression 
model. The dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q ratio, as defined by Lins (2003). As an 
alternative proxy for market value, we also use the Market-to-Book ratio as a dependent 
variable (c.f., Hassan et al., 2009; Lins, 2003). Independent variables include the compliance 
levels with disclosure requirements and other variables identified in the prior empirical 
research cited below as being related to market value. This leads to the following: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠𝑄𝑗 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝑆𝑗 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝑎3𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑗 + 𝑎4𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑗 + 𝑎5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 + 𝑎6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑗 ++ 𝑎7𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗 + 𝑎8𝐹𝑎𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝐹𝑗 + 𝑎9𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗    (Eq. 5) 
where Tobin’sQj equals market value of equity four months after the company’s year-end 
date plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets; CSj is the 
                                                 
17 See footnotes 8 and 22 on how we identify members of the same family. 
 22 
compliance score, measured either by the PC method or Cooke’s method; Industryj is a 
dummy variable where 1 represents manufacturing companies and 0 otherwise (e.g., Hassan 
et al., 2009); ROEj is the ratio of net income to total shareholders’ equity; Liqj is the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities (e.g., Al-Akra & Ali, 2012); Sizej is the natural logarithm 
of total sales (e.g., Mishra et al., 2001); Levj is the ratio of total liabilities to total 
shareholders’ equity; Growth is the percentage change of sales between 2008 and 2007 (e.g., 
Ntim et al., 2012); FamContF is a dummy variable where 1 represents firms with ‘family 
controlled boards’ i.e., family firms and 0 otherwise (see discussion in section 4.2 above); 
OthOwn is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the ultimate owner is either a foreign 
investor or the firm is widely held (e.g., Tam & Tan, 2007); and µj is the mean zero 
disturbance term. 
In all the multivariate analyses, we test for multicollinearity with a variance inflation 
factor of (VIF)>10 as a threshold (Gujarati, 2003, p. 262) and report the VIF values for each 
regression in Tables 6-10.18 We also control for heteroskedasticity by employing White’s 
(1980) corrected coefficients. Heteroskedasticity may also result from the presence of outliers 
(Gujarati, 2003, p. 390). We define and exclude outliers by using Cook’s Distance.   
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all corporate governance characteristics 
(continuous variables) used in the paper. Panel A refers to the full sample and Panels B and C 
refer to the two sub-samples of firms with two or more family members on the board (family 
firms) and non-family firms.  
                                                 
18A Pearson correlation matrix (not tabulated) also indicates that there is no collinearity between the 
independent variables employed in these analyses. No association higher than 0.5 exists. 
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The mean (median) family control for our sample firms is 20% (14%). We identify 100 
companies with equal to two or more family members on the board (family firms), for which 
mean (median) family control is 38% (38%). For the sub-sample of the remaining 121 non-
family firms the mean (median) family control is 4% (0%). Both values are significantly 
lower at the 1% level for the sub-sample of non-family firms (see Panel D). This suggests 
that partitioning our sample based on the cut-off point of two or more family members on the 
board captures appropriately the significance of the influence of family members on board 
decisions.    
The size of the board of directors ranges between four and 14 people (median: eight), and 
that of the audit committee between three and nine (median: three). These wide ranges reflect 
a lack of binding rules. The size of audit committees is significantly larger for non-family 
firms than for family firms (at the 1% level). The number of board (audit committee) 
meetings ranges between two and 16 (none and 17) for the full sample. Non-family firms 
exhibit greater variability than family firms on those measures. The number of board 
meetings of family firms, however, is significantly lower (at the 1% level) than that of non-
family firms. About 37% of the audit committee and 25% of the board members have an 
accounting background (as a measure of expertise). Both the mean and median of this 
measure are significantly lower for family firms (at the 1% level).  
Compliance with corporate governance codes is based on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. In 
practice, this appears ineffective (see Liew, 2007; Tam & Tan, 2007). For example, a 2006 
survey by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (cited in Hasnan et al., 2013, p. 3) found that 
‘Malaysia scored nine on a scale of ten for having the most rules and regulations for 
corporate governance, but scored only 3.5 in enforcement’. This is further confirmed by our 
findings: the minimum proportion of independent directors (Ind_Dir) in our sample is 20%. 
The Bursa Listing rules suggest that the proportion should be at least one third. Twenty 
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family firms did not comply with this Bursa recommendation.19 This explains why both the 
mean (41%) and median (40%) of this measure are significantly lower for the sub-sample of 
family firms (at the 5% and 10% level respectively).   
Overall, these results indicate variation in the quality of corporate governance over the 
sample companies with several areas indicating lower quality for family firms (board size, 
audit committee size and number of meetings, number of board meetings and accounting 
expertise of board members). 
TABLE 2 – ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 shows that the mean (median) level of compliance with disclosure requirements 
for our sample firms is 84% (85%) for the PC method, and 88% (89%) for Cooke’s method. 
Compliance levels range from 53% to 98% under the PC method, and from 65% to 98% 
under Cooke’s method.20 Across the sub-samples of family and non-family firms, the latter 
seem to have higher disclosure scores. However, only when the compliance levels are 
measured with the PC method do these levels differ significantly (mean at the 10% level and 
median at the 5% level). However, regardless of the method used for measuring compliance, 
higher compliance scores are observed in non-family firms. We observe substantial 
differences between the minimum compliance scores across the two sub-samples, although 
the sign of these differences changes across the sub-samples depending on the method used 
for measuring compliance. These descriptive statistics indicate that family firms tend to have 
lower disclosure levels than non-family firms. Overall, the wide range of scores, and the very 
low minimum levels of compliance identified, confirm prior findings which suggest relatively 
weak enforcement and concerns about the quality of Malaysian IFRS reporting.  
                                                 
19 None of these firms explains the reasons for not following this guidance.  
20 Although not tabulated, the average and median disclosure levels differ significantly when calculated with the 
PC and Cooke’s method - the PC method produces significantly lower scores. This is in line with Tsalavoutas et 
al.’s (2010) and Tsalavoutas’ (2011) findings in a Greek context. 
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Finally, non-family firms appear to be significantly larger (at the 1% level)21 and exhibit 
significantly higher Tobin’s Q (at the 5% level) and Market-to-Book ratios (mean at the 10% 
level and median at the 1% level). The latter is consistent with the earlier Malaysian evidence 
of Tam & Tan (2007) who find that family firms perform less well than non-family firms, in 
terms of Tobin’s Q.  
TABLE 3 – ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 4 – ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous variables. Only 11% of the 
total sample firms have a chairman who is also the CEO. However, 15 of these 25 firms are 
family firms, indicating that in terms of this measure, family firms exhibit poorer corporate 
governance (significant at the 10% level). Seventy-two percent of the companies in our 
sample are audited by a ‘Big-4’ firm; with a still higher proportion of non-family firms (80%) 
(significant at the 5% level). For 141 of our sample firms the ultimate owner is a family, for 
50 the state, and for the remaining 30 ultimate ownership is classified as ‘other’ (either the 
ultimate owner is a foreign investor (21) or the firm is widely held (nine)). The information 
presented in Table 4 also sheds light on the cultures dominating our sub-samples:22 for 63% 
(77%) of family firms the Chairman (CEO) is of Chinese origin. The corresponding figures 
for the non-family firms are 23% and 33% respectively. This, and the evidence presented in 
Table 2 above (last column (Malay)) demonstrate that the dominant culture on companies’ 
boards is not Malay (significant at the 1% level). (The mean (median) percentage of board 
members of Bumiputera origin in our sample is 46% (38%)). Both the mean (32%) and 
median (29%) percentage of board members of Bumiputera origin are significantly lower for 
the sub-sample of family firms (at the 1% level)). For ultimate owners (Table 4), Chinese 
                                                 
21 This is consistent with Bertrand & Schoar (2006), who suggest that where there is more than one (male) heir, 
inheritance norms may result in a relatively small average size of family businesses. 
22In Malaysia, ethnicity of an individual can normally be identified by his/her name. Malaysian Chinese names 
are typically Chinese in origin; Malay names are typically Arabic patronymics.  
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ethnic origin dominates our sample (52%); this applies to family firms in particular. This is 
consistent with Ball et al.’s (2003) and Tam & Tan’s (2007) findings that Chinese culture 
continues to dominate family businesses and that the proportion of Bumiputera in the 
Malaysian business environment continues to be lower than that of Chinese. Finally, for 86% 
of the sub-sample of family firms, one of the family members is also the CEO; and for 63% 
one of the family members is also the Chairman. 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on the compliance scores for each standard 
individually. Compliance scores across standards are ranked in descending order on the basis 
of the mean score of the full sample.  
TABLE 5 – ABOUT HERE 
FRS 101 is the standard with the highest average compliance score (96%) and the lowest 
standard deviation (3%). An explanation for this high level of compliance is that much of the 
required information is basic (e.g. name of entity, description of operations, and key items 
included in the financial statements) and complying therefore does not imply high proprietary 
costs (Al-Shammari, 2005).  
However, standards incorporating measurement and/or recognition requirements that are 
different or absent from earlier Malaysian GAAP exhibit very low average levels of 
compliance and significant variability of compliance scores. Low levels of compliance and 
high variability are also exhibited for standards involving high proprietary costs. Examples 
include: FRS 140 (78%, sd: 13%); FRS 3 (77%, sd: 18%); FRS 19 (75%, sd: 26%); FRS 17 
(74%, sd: 23%); and FRS 36 (72%, sd: 21%). Table 5 also indicates that some companies do 
not provide any of the information required for some standards (i.e. compliance scores are 
zero).  
Some notable differences become apparent across the two sub-samples: for FRS 5, FRS 
138, FRS 3 and FRS 119 the mean scores for non-family firms are much higher and the 
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standard deviations much smaller. Except for FRS 2, the mean disclosure levels are always 
higher for non-family firms. However, these differences are not statistically significant.  
These descriptive statistics are in line with the aggregate scores presented in Table 3, in 
that family firms tend to have lower disclosure levels than non-family firms. In general, these 
results are consistent with prior literature, suggesting that in Malaysia the quality of financial 
reporting and corporate governance is problematic in terms of practice and enforcement.          
   
5.2 Disclosure levels and family control 
This section reports the findings of the multivariate analyses for H1, concerning the negative 
relationship between family control and the extent of compliance with disclosure 
requirements. Table 6 shows that all regressions are significant at the 1% level (F-statistic) 
and that VIF values are lower than two.  
TABLE 6 – ABOUT HERE 
Our results show that the impact of family control on disclosure is negative. Independent 
of the disclosure method followed, the coefficients of this variable are negative and 
statistically significant (-0.094, p < 0.001; -0.668, p < 0.001; -0.033, p < 0.05; -0.285, p < 
0.10), confirming H1. In other words, the higher the level of family control, the lower the 
levels of mandatory disclosures. This raises questions about the ability or intent of family 
controlled boards to ensure that the financial statements are reliable and free from material 
misstatement. In fact, boards may be opportunistic in selecting information to be disclosed. 
This is because the findings in Table 5 indicate high non-compliance levels with standards 
involving high proprietary costs. Thus, our findings support those of Holland (2006), i.e. that 
directors influence disclosures. They also support Chen et al.’s (2008, p. 501) argument that 
specifically family owners ‘can tilt firms’ disclosure toward their preference’.  
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The arguments of Holland (2006) and Chen et al. (2008) were based on findings with 
regard to voluntary disclosures. We find that they also hold with regard to mandatory 
disclosures. Overall, our results support the premise that the Malaysian institutional setting 
does not provide effective mechanisms (sanctions and incentives) to overcome Type 2 agency 
problems, i.e. to align the interests of dominant family members with those of minority 
shareholders. Ownership concentration is high and investor protection is weak (Zhuang et al., 
2000); auditing does not provide effective sanctions, and minority shareholders are 
disincentivised from participating in corporate decision-making.   
Further, our findings can be interpreted from a cultural perspective. As shown in Tables 
2 and 4, family firms tend to be dominated by Chinese culture in which, given the guanxi 
networks, demand for public disclosure is reduced, and information asymmetry is resolved 
through private communication channels (Ball et al., 2003). Finally, since we focus on 
mandatory disclosures which compel the disclosure of proprietary and non-proprietary, good 
and bad news, these results indicate that family firms prefer to accept regulatory risk (cf., 
Adams, 1994) to the provision of more information. This begs the question regarding the 
potential benefits, for financial statements users, of moving to a regime which requires 
greater mandatory disclosure. 
Across our whole sample, compliance levels are also explained by certain corporate 
governance characteristics. Although board expertise is negatively related, the proportion of 
independent directors on the audit committee and the number of board meetings are 
positively related to disclosure levels.23 Table 2 indicates that, in general, audit committees 
exhibit a very high ratio of independent members. Audit committee independence may ensure 
the independence of external auditors and increase audit quality (Favere-Marchesi, 2000). 
                                                 
23Results differ slightly, depending upon the method followed for measuring disclosure levels (cf. Street & 
Gray, 2001; Tsalavoutas, 2011). Under Cooke’s method only, we find evidence indicating that the size of the 
audit committee is negatively related to disclosure levels. Under the PC method only, ROE is positively related 
to disclosure levels. In both cases, the signs of the coefficients are the same under both methods. 
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Further, independent directors are more responsive to investors, and are thus more likely to 
enforce compliance with disclosure requirements (Mangena & Pike, 2005). Although Kent & 
Stewart (2008) did not find any association between audit committee independence and 
corporate disclosure quality in Australia, our results indicate that listing requirements relating 
to audit committee independence appear to be effective in Malaysia.  
The positive and significant association between board meetings and mandatory 
disclosure levels suggests that frequent board meetings result in a more effective performance 
of governance duties by directors. This finding is consistent with Kent & Stewart’s (2008) 
findings for Australia. 
The finding that board expertise is significantly and negatively associated with 
mandatory disclosure levels may appear perverse. One would expect that board members 
with accounting or financial management expertise should be more familiar with accounting 
standards’ requirements and be able to detect any misstatements or instances of non-
compliance, and to advise and monitor management accordingly (Mangena & Pike, 2005). 
However, board members may also use such expertise opportunistically, by applying their 
knowledge of legal loopholes which may be used to avoid mandatory disclosure. Abdullah 
(2011) suggests that board members in Malaysia both possess good knowledge of accounting 
standards and influence financial statement preparation. Kent & Stewart (2008) also find a 
negative association between audit committee expertise and the extent of mandatory 
disclosures. 
Although we have not set a specific research hypothesis to establish whether disclosure 
levels are determined by the same factors across family and non-family controlled firms, we 
conduct the same tests, splitting our sample across family and non-family firms. The results 
are presented in Table 7.  
TABLE 7 – ABOUT HERE 
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The finding that the number of board meetings is positively related with disclosure levels 
holds true across both sub-samples. However, the proportion of independent directors on the 
audit committee is positively related with disclosure levels only in the case of family firms 
(where it is likely that the independent directors mitigate the influence of the family 
members). Thus, where Type 2 agency problems dominate and family control impacts 
negatively on disclosure, the greater the number of independent directors on the audit 
committees the higher the positive impact on disclosure.  
The finding that board expertise is negatively related to disclosure levels holds true only 
for non-family firms. As noted above, accounting expertise of board members is significantly 
higher in non-family firms (see Table 2). It therefore appears that in firms where Type 1 
agency problems dominate, the accounting expertise of board members may impact 
negatively on disclosure levels.  
For family firms, audit committee size is negatively related to disclosure. Larger audit 
committees may exhibit more expertise, thus resulting in greater authority in decision 
making. However, in cases where Type 2 agency problems dominate (i.e., family firms), this 
may result in a reduction in mandatory disclosure. Kent & Stewart (2008) also find a 
significant negative association between audit committee size and the extent of mandatory 
disclosure in Australia. 
In summary, the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements by 
Malaysian companies is determined by a company’s (non-) family status but is also related 
significantly to certain corporate governance characteristics. While the impact of family 
control on mandatory disclosure is negative, this is mitigated by (some) good corporate 
governance practices, which are, however, weaker in family firms.  
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5.3 Disclosure levels and firm value 
H2 posited a significant relationship between firm value and mandatory disclosure levels. 
Table 8 reports the findings of the relevant multivariate analyses. Panel A report the findings 
when the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and panel B the corresponding tests when the 
dependent variable is Market-to-Book ratio. All regressions are significant at the 1% level (F-
statistic) and all VIF values are lower than 2.  
TABLE 8 – ABOUT HERE 
The results do not reveal any support for H2. This holds independent of the method used 
for calculating compliance levels and how firm value is defined. Mandatory disclosure levels 
are not related significantly with market values. This contrasts with Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou 
(2014), who find a positive relationship for Greece, and Hassan et al. (2009), who find a 
negative relationship for Egypt.  
This may be explained as follows: First, while levels of mandatory disclosure may affect 
market values in specific stock-markets (e.g. Greece, Egypt) differently, they are not 
significant to investors in environments such as Malaysia, characterised by such a unique 
financial reporting, institutional and cultural environment. Family firms in particular, would 
not benefit from more efficient contracting with a view to mitigating agency problems, since 
the market understands the influence of family members on disclosures. The latter therefore 
do not serve valuation purposes. These arguments may also hold for the companies whose 
ultimate owner is the state (which make up large proportion of our non-family firms). Hence, 
our finding is supported by the arguments of Ball et al. (2003), i.e. that information 
asymmetry is resolved by private communication channels. This means that compliance with 
disclosure requirements does not impact on market values since the market is already 
informed. This, in turn, means that there is no support for efficiency based theories which 
suggest that high quality financial reporting effectively mitigates against weak investor 
 32 
protection and insider trading in emerging capital markets such as in Malaysia (cf. Leventis 
& Weetman, 2004). 
Second, information required by mandatory disclosures can be interpreted as bad or as 
good news. Therefore some disclosure items will have a negative effect on a company’s 
value while others have a positive effect. Hence, the net effect may be negligible. Also, 
disclosures may have a positive effect on some firms’ value but a negative effect on others 
(Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 2014). Also, the interpretation of these findings assumes that 
investors understand and evaluate the notes to the financial statements. This may not always 
be the case. Further, selective or incomplete reporting/disclosure may mislead investors. 
More specifically, the findings in Table 5 indicate high non-compliance levels for standards 
involving high proprietary costs. This suggests that potentially relevant information is absent. 
As a result, the information revealed by the remaining standards (i.e., non-proprietary) does 
not add value. In summary, our findings highlight the need for future research in this area. 
The valuation implications of mandatory disclosure remain far from clear.  
With regard to the remaining variables in the model examined, we find the following: 
first, we find that the effect of ‘family controlled boards’ on market value is negative. More 
specifically, the coefficient of FamContF is consistently negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% or 5% levels. This finding supports our conclusions in respect of H1; it also 
supports prior literature which suggest the existence of Type 2 agency problems in Malaysia. 
Given a weak regulatory environment, auditing and investor protection, family members may 
use their controlling position to extract private benefits at the expense of other, non-family, 
shareholders not involved in decision making. This may be exacerbated in Malaysia, in 
particular given the cultural background of family board members (cf., Bertrand & Schoar, 
2006). Our findings reflect theories which suggest that culture may account for the 
(under)performance of some family firms better, than efficiency based theories which suggest 
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that family firms may act as substitutes for weak formal investor protection. Family firms 
exhibit lower market value. This finding also sheds more light on the evidence provided by 
Lim et al. (2014), who find that family firms in Malaysia in particular prefer a more opaque 
environment (measured by significantly less timeliness in price discovery). Moreover, 
consistent with the finding of Tam & Tan (2007) that foreign firms exhibit superior market 
performance, we also find evidence that widely dispersed or ultimate foreign ownership 
result in a positive impact on market value (coefficient of the variable OthOwn is consistently 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels). This is also consistent with the 
finding with regard to the effect of ‘family controlled boards’ on market value: firms less 
likely to face Type 2 agency problems perform best. Finally, consistent with prior literature 
(Al-Akra & Ali, 2012), ROE, liquidity and leverage all have positive and significant 
associations with market value.24 
 
5.4 Sensitivity tests25 
To minimise the possibility that our results are susceptible to choices associated with the 
research design, we performed a set of additional tests. Foreign sales to total turnover can be 
a proxy for the international exposure of a firm that could attract additional scrutiny. Thus, 
we hand-collected this data from the annual reports of our sample firms (105 of which 
disclosed foreign sales) and incorporated foreign sales/total sales as an additional 
independent variable within the regressions presented in Tables 6 and 7. Prior evidence also 
suggests an influence of ownership on disclosure levels (e.g., Al-Akra, 2010). We therefore 
                                                 
24 We also split our sample across family and non-family firms and explore the determinants of firm value for 
the two sub-samples separately. These tests indicate that being a manufacturing firm (and ROE) has a 
significantly negative (positive) relation with firm value for family firms, while size has no significant relation 
with firm value for these firms. For non-family firms, ROE, size, other ownership and leverage all have positive 
and significant associations with market value. Tables reporting these results are available on request. 
25 The results of the tests discussed in this sub-section are available on request. 
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also included OthOwn and StatOwn as additional control variables in these tests (see section 
4.4 and information reported in Table 4 (section 5.1) for more information about these 
variables). None of these had a significant coefficient. Moreover, as an alternative to using 
the actual disclosure score as the dependent variable, we replicated all relevant tests in Tables 
6 and 7 with the fractional logit model suggested by Papke & Wooldridge (1996). The results 
of all of these additional tests were almost identical to those presented in the paper. For H2, 
we also applied Ohlson’s (1995) model (see e.g. Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou, 2014). In this 
framework, book value of equity and net income act as main determinants of market value, 
and the disclosure levels as ‘other information’. With these tests also, mandatory disclosure 
levels are value irrelevant, irrespective of how mandatory disclosure is scored/measured. 
We further re-performed the tests reported in Tables 6, 7, and 8, based on alternative 
definitions of family firm. Based on our original definition, our sub-sample of 121 non-
family firms contains 36 companies in which one board member holds more than 5% of 
shares (either individually or in combination with his/her relatives) (see above). It may be 
argued that this board member can also exert significant influence on board decisions, 
including decisions on mandatory disclosure levels. In fact, Villalonga & Amit (2006; 2010) 
classify such firms also as family firms. For Tables 6 and 8, we therefore substitute Family 
(i.e., family representation on the board) with this new dummy variable where one is a 
Family firm (i.e., one board member holds more than 5% of shares) and zero otherwise. 
Based on this definition we have 136 family firms and 85 non-family firms. For the other 
Tables, the sample is partitioned according to this new classification. The results and our 
main conclusions do not change (Tables 6, 7 and 8). We observe some minor differences in 
the significance of some determinants of disclosure levels in the corresponding tests for Table 
7. However, these do not affect the conclusions with regard to the hypotheses tested. Finally, 
we also used Jaggi et al.’s (2009: 288) definition of family firms as firms with a family as the 
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ultimate shareholder (i.e., a family holding more than 20% of the company’s shares). This 
results in 141 firms classified as family-firms and 80 as non-family firms (see Table 4). The 
results of these additional tests are almost identical to those discussed above. Hence, the main 
conclusions of the study do not change under either alternative.  
 
6. Conclusions  
Since 2005, Malaysia has been converging its national accounting standards with IFRS. IFRS 
require high levels of disclosures. Regulators and standard setters are concerned about the 
implications of (non-) compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements (Schipper, 2007). 
This study contributes to the literature on the effect of ownership structure on mandatory 
disclosure practices. It also responds to calls for research on the valuation implications of 
mandatory disclosure (cf. Hassan et al., 2009; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Schipper, 2007) by 
contributing a specific country case study to the limited prior literature in this area. 
We measure compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements by Malaysian companies 
and test two hypotheses linking ownership structure (particularly, family control), compliance 
with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements and firm value. As expected (H1), we find a 
negative relationship between family control and IFRS disclosure levels. We also find that, 
on balance, higher quality corporate governance is associated with higher disclosure levels. 
The corporate governance characteristics which appear significant vary between family and 
non-family firms. Against our expectations (H2), we do not find a significant relationship 
between disclosure levels and market values. However, our findings support prior literature 
(e.g. Ball et al., 2003) in suggesting that dominance of family ownership in East Asian 
settings reduces demand for public reporting.  
Our findings suggest that agency theory predictions and theories linking common law 
legal systems to high quality financial reporting require refining in certain national contexts. 
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Where Type 2 agency problems dominate, institutional arrangements intended to enhance 
financial reporting quality aimed at mitigating Type 1 problems in developed markets may 
have limited effect in less developed jurisdictions. In Malaysia, politics is dominated by 
ethnic Malays and business by ethnic Chinese, but within business organisations ethnic 
groups are not evenly represented: family firms are dominated by Chinese culture, while this 
is not the case for non-family firms. Malaysia has introduced rigorous financial reporting and 
corporate governance rules, which however do not appear to be fully effective. In particular, 
family firms are less likely to comply with corporate governance requirements and boards are 
less able or willing to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements than boards of non-
family firms. Since non-compliance is particularly high for standards associated with high 
proprietary costs, it is likely that boards disclose selectively, to their advantage, and that they 
consciously and deliberately manage the associated regulatory risk. This applies in particular 
to family firms, who appear to prefer greater regulatory risk to the provision of more 
information. Given that family firms are dominated by Chinese culture, the tendency to avoid 
disclosing information with high proprietary cost but to accept higher regulatory risk may 
well be influenced by culture. 
This suggests that in environments such as Malaysia, with unusual political and cultural 
settings, culture, local politics and other less-quantifiable socio-political factors interact with 
micro- and macro-economic forces to affect compliance culture, the management of 
regulatory risk and market values; particular cultural networks may also substitute for some 
corporate governance safeguards in certain types of closely held firms. Such factors may 
modify and enrich insights from ‘grand’ theories (such as agency theory or disclosure 
theories) even within the same jurisdiction/nation state. Our findings and the above 
considerations also lead us to question the potential benefits, for financial statements users, of 
moving to a regime which requires greater mandatory disclosure, since they suggest a lack of 
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support for efficiency based theories which argue that high quality financial reporting acts as 
a mechanism to compensate for weak investor protection and insider trading in emerging 
capital markets (cf. Leventis & Weetman, 2004).  
Our findings have implications for standard setters, regulators and the market. The fact 
that in Malaysia increased levels of mandatory disclosure appear to be value irrelevant, 
suggests that investors do not require, or do not trust the information provided in companies’ 
financial statements. A stronger regulatory and enforcement environment may improve value 
relevance. However, more generally, policy-makers may need to consider carefully the 
feasibility of policies aimed at improving transparency and market-mechanisms for specific 
local environments where, as in Malaysia, macro-economic policies may be more effective 
(cf. Arnold, 2012).  
Our findings may also contribute to informing debates on mandatory disclosures in 
accounting standards, including the IFRS Foundation’s current Disclosure Initiative project. 
This identified the attitudes of auditors and regulators, as well as cost consideration, as 
impediments to compliance with disclosure requirements and calls for behavioral change to 
combat information overload.26 The IASB is also discussing disclosures in the ongoing 
Conceptual Framework project, and considering a specific disclosure framework for IFRS, 
which would replace a number of current standards that deal predominantly with disclosures. 
The question of disclosures is also currently occupying the SEC,27 the FASB, the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) and the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB), among others.  
                                                 
26 See http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/PressRelease/Documents/2013/Feedback-Statement-Discussion-Forum-
Financial-Reporting-Disclosure-May-2013.pdf; http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/Conference/Pages/Hans-
Hoogervorst-Speech-Amsterdam-June-2013.aspx; http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/PressRelease/Pages/Joint-effort-
needed-to-tackle-disclosure-problem.aspx; http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Disclosure-
Initiative/Pages/Disclosure-Initiative.aspx.  
27 http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2014/01/27/mary-jo-white-wants-sec-to-rethink-corporate-disclosures/ 
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If (mandatory) disclosures are not effective, theories relating to the cost of capital and 
market liquidity (Botosan 1997; Leuz & Wysocki 2008) may not hold. Further, some of the 
problems identified by regulators and standard setters, such as poorly drafted or duplicating 
disclosure requirements or those that focus on immaterial issues, may contribute to non-
compliance. Thus the low levels of mandatory disclosures identified for Malaysian firms in 
the present paper may be due to the weak regulatory environment but also to a lack of clarity 
in the requirements. Efforts to improve the disclosure framework to encourage more effective 
communication, with more streamlined and therefore more manageable disclosure 
requirements, may in particular benefit less developed markets with large proportions of 
closely held firms.  
On the other hand, international and national standard setters need to take into account 
two further considerations: First, financial statements are increasingly not the only and 
arguably not the most important information channel for management and investors to 
communicate. Our findings support the suggestion that, in particular in family owned firms, 
their role is limited. Second, as noted by Ball (2006), in spite of the IASB’s best efforts, 
politics and markets will continue to be subject to local influences. We suggest that for 
Malaysia, the impact of culture on business and politics is among these local influences. 
Other jurisdictions will have their own unique features. Neither standard setters nor foreign 
investors can therefore ignore the ‘deep-rooted political and economic factors that influence 
the incentives of financial statement preparers and that inevitably shape actual financial 
reporting practice’ (ibid., p. 6). Thus, while a revised Conceptual Framework and a 
framework for disclosures may alleviate non-compliance and other problems related to 
mandatory disclosure requirements, they are unlikely to eliminate them. In particular, our 
findings suggest that adoption of IFRS and rigorous corporate governance guidelines alone 
do not result in a de facto improvement of the quality of financial reporting. Companies may 
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continue not to comply with the new standards and guidelines unless more effective 
enforcement mechanisms are in place.  
Our study is subject to a number of limitations. Despite following all usual procedures to 
ensure the validity and reliability of the research instrument, the use of a disclosure index 
always entails a degree of subjectivity. This may hinder consistent replication of the research. 
Finally, the results of the study may be time specific. The variation and the relatively low 
levels of disclosures identified might be an outcome of preparers’ low familiarity with the 
disclosure requirements of the new standards. Consequently compliance levels may improve 
in the future. This suggests, as one avenue for future research, an investigation of changes in 
compliance with disclosure requirements since the period examined in the present paper. 
Research could also explore other consequences of mandatory disclosure levels, such as the 
effect on cost of debt and equity capital, or analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion. 
Qualitative behavioural research exploring preparers’ motivations for (non-)disclosure or 
regulators’ perspectives would add depth to our understanding regarding management’s 
decision making. Finally, future research could explore the above issues also in other settings. 
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TABLE 1: Sample selection process 
Step 1: Focusing on companies listed on the Main board No. of companies 
Total number of listed companies as at 31 December 2008 977 
(-) Companies listed on Second board and Mesdaq market (343) 
Companies listed on the Main board 634 
(-) Financial companies  (41) 
(-) Companies that had not publish annual reports for the year 2008 on the 
Bursa Malaysia’s website at the time our data was collected 
(142) 
Total 451 
Step 2: Dividing companies identified across categories according to their size  
Large (Total assets > = RM 1 billion) 215 
Medium (RM 200,000 < Total assets < RM 1 billion 146 
Small (Below or equal RM200,000) 90 
Total 451 
Step 3: Choosing, randomly, 50% of the companies from each strata 
Large (Total assets > = RM 1 billion) 50% * 215 = 107 
Medium (RM 200,000 < Total assets < RM 1 billion 50% * 146 = 73 
Small (Below or equal RM200,000) 50% * 90 = 45 
(-) Companies with negative book value of equity (4) 
Total 221 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics - corporate governance characteristics (Continuous variables)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Family is the percentage of family members on the Board. Family firms are firms with two or more family members on the board (Jaggi et al., 2009 – see section for 4.2 for relevant 
discussion). Definitions for the remaining variables are provided in section 4.4. The means tested with the ‘paired-samples t-test’ and the medians tested with the ‘Wilcoxon signed rank 
test’. Two-tailed t and z-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample (N=221) 
 Family Ind_dir BS ACEx ACS ACM BEx BM Ind_dir_AC Malay 
Mean 0.20 0.43 8.16 0.37 3.52 5.00 0.25 5.76 0.82 0.46 
SD 0.20 0.11 2.07 0.17 0.86 1.64 0.13 2.17 0.17 0.30 
Median 0.14 0.42 8.00 0.33 3.00 5.00 0.25 5.00 0.75 0.38 
Min 0.00 0.20 4.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.25 0.00 
Max 0.83 0.78 14.00 1.00 9.00 17.00 0.80 16.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel B: Family firms (i.e., FamContF = 1) (N=100) 
Mean 0.38 0.41 8.00 0.37 3.36 4.82 0.23 5.14 0.84 0.32 
SD 0.14 0.10 2.22 0.19 0.61 1.08 0.12 1.30 0.17 0.24 
Median 0.38 0.40 8.00 0.33 3.00 5.00 0.20 5.00 0.90 0.29 
Min 0.14 0.22 4.00 0.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.25 0.00 
Max 0.83 0.67 14.00 1.00 6.00 10.00 0.67 9.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel C: Non-family firms (i.e., FamContF = 0) (N=121) 
Mean 0.04 0.44 8.29 0.38 3.65 5.16 0.27 6.27 0.80 0.57 
SD 0.06 0.11 1.93 0.16 1.00 1.98 0.13 2.59 0.17 0.29 
Median 0.00 0.43 8.00 0.33 3.00 5.00 0.25 6.00 0.75 0.58 
Min 0.00 0.20 4.00 0.14 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.29 0.00 
Max 0.17 0.78 13.00 1.00 9.00 17.00 0.80 16.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel D: Tests of equality of means and medians between Family and Non-family firms 
Mean  
-0.34  
(-24.06)*** 
0.03 
(1.98)** 
0.29 
(1.04) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.23 
(2.56)** 
0.34 
(1.52) 
0.04 
(2.75)*** 
1.13 
(3.98)*** 
-0.04  
(-1.55) 
0.25 
(6.86)*** 
Median 
-0.38  
(-13.15)*** 
0.03 
(1.83)* 
0.00 
(1.23) 
0.00 
(0.49) 
0.00 
(2.43)** 
0.00 
(1.10) 
0.05 
(2.60)*** 
1.00 
(3.32)*** 
-0.15  
(-1.37) 
0.29 
(6.11)*** 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics - compliance levels and other company 
characteristics (Continuous variables) 
PC (Cooke’s) is the compliance score, measured by the PC (Cooke’s) method. Family firms are firms 
with two or more family members on the board (Jaggi et al., 2009 - – see section for 4.2 for relevant 
discussion). Definitions for the remaining variables are provided in section 4.4. The means tested with 
the ‘paired-samples t-test’ and the medians tested with the ‘Wilcoxon signed rank test’. Two-tailed t and 
z-values are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample (N=221) 
 PC Cookes ROE Growth Liq Size Lev TobinsQ MTB 
Mean 0.84 0.88 0.13 0.18 2.77 13.20 0.95 1.12 1.51 
SD 0.07 0.05 0.27 0.36 3.62 1.66 1.14 0.98 2.75 
Median 0.85 0.89 0.13 0.14 1.69 13.19 0.62 0.88 0.89 
Min 0.53 0.65 -0.92 -0.69 0.11 9.08 0.00 0.05 0.01 
Max 0.98 0.98 2.73 3.24 31.51 17.34 9.99 9.27 31.24 
Panel B:  Family firms (i.e., FamContF = 1) (N=100) 
Mean 0.83 0.88 0.13 0.17 2.93 12.76 0.94 0.97 1.18 
SD 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.29 4.08 1.52 1.06 0.75 2.07 
Median 0.84 0.88 0.12 0.15 1.79 12.54 0.61 0.82 0.76 
Min 0.53 0.72 -0.31 -0.69 0.28 9.43 0.01 0.40 0.13 
Max 0.96 0.96 1.42 1.35 31.51 16.50 7.67 6.91 19.37 
Panel C:  Non-family firms (i.e., FamContF = 0) (N=121) 
Mean 0.85 0.88 0.13 0.19 2.63 13.56 0.97 1.25 1.78 
SD 0.07 0.05 0.32 0.40 3.20 1.70 1.20 1.12 3.19 
Median 0.86 0.90 0.14 0.13 1.63 13.60 0.63 0.97 1.02 
Min 0.59 0.65 -0.92 -0.53 0.11 9.08 0.00 0.05 0.01 
Max 0.98 0.98 2.73 3.24 24.43 17.34 9.99 9.27 31.24 
Panel D: Tests of equality of means and medians between Family and Non-family firms 
Mean  
0.02 
(1.82)* 
0.00 
(0.82) 
0.00 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
-0.30  
(-0.61) 
0.80 
(3.66)*** 
0.03 
(0.20) 
0.27 
(2.09)** 
0.61 
(1.64)* 
Median 
0.03 
(2.10)** 
0.02 
(1.33) 
0.02 
(0.84) 
-0.02 
 (-0.43) 
-0.15 
 (-0.83) 
1.6 
(3.84)*** 
0.02  
(-0.20) 
0.15 
(2.46)** 
0.26 
(2.98)*** 
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TABLE 4: Descriptive statistics (Dichotomous variables) 
 
Full sample 
(221) 
% 
Family 
firms (100) 
% 
Non-Family 
firms (121) 
% 
DUAL = 1 25 0.11 15 0.15 10 0.08 
   (-1.82)* 
Industry = 1 94 0.43 54 0.54 40 0.33 
   (-3.23)*** 
Aud = 1 159 0.72 63 0.63 96 0.79 
   (2.60)** 
FamOwn = 1 141 0.64 94 0.94 47 0.39 
   (-8.51)*** 
StatOwn= 1 50 0.23 0 0.00 50 0.41 
   (7.52)*** 
OthOwn = 1 30 0.14 6 0.06 24 0.20 
   (2.69)*** 
CEO_Fam = 1 112 0.51 86 0.86 26 0.22 
   (-9.73)*** 
Chair_Chin = 1 91 0.41 63 0.63 28 0.23 
   (-6.05)*** 
CEO_Chin = 1  117 0.53 77 0.77 40 0.33 
   (-6.57)*** 
BumiOwn = 1 75 0.34 11 0.11 64 0.53 
   (6.76)*** 
ChinOwn = 1 115 0.52 84 0.84 31 0.26 
   (-8.68)*** 
 
Family firms are firms with two or more family members on the board (Jaggi et al., 2009 - see section for 4.2 for 
relevant discussion). For all other variable definitions see in sections 4.3 & 4.4. Differences across the two sub-
samples have been tested for significance with the pairwise test of proportions. z-values are in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5: Frequency and distribution of compliance scores for each standard separately. 
Standards  NS NT Mean SD Min Max Median 
Panel A: Full sample (N=221) 
FRS101 69 221 0.96 0.03 0.87 1.00 0.97 
FRS5 12 70 0.94 0.14 0.33 1.00 1.00 
FRS116 15 221 0.93 0.11 0.46 1.00 1.00 
FRS114 20 178 0.93 0.17 0.00 1.00 1.00 
FRS132 34 219 0.89 0.12 0.30 1.00 0.91 
FRS2 12 90 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.88 
FRS138 14 87 0.79 0.22 0.29 1.00 0.83 
FRS140 20 114 0.78 0.13 0.40 1.00 0.83 
FRS3 20 72 0.77 0.18 0.13 1.00 0.80 
FRS119 21 221 0.75 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.80 
FRS117 19 183 0.74 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.75 
FRS136 39 153 0.72 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.79 
Panel B: Family firms (i.e., FamContF = 1) (N=100) 
FRS101 69 100 0.95 0.03 0.87 1.00 0.97 
FRS5 12 24 0.91 0.18 0.33 1.00 1.00 
FRS116 15 100 0.92 0.11 0.46 1.00 1.00 
FRS114 20 88 0.93 0.17 0.00 1.00 1.00 
FRS132 34 100 0.89 0.11 0.50 1.00 0.90 
FRS2 12 45 0.84 0.11 0.67 1.00 0.86 
FRS138 14 29 0.76 0.24 0.33 1.00 0.83 
FRS140 20 55 0.77 0.12 0.40 0.90 0.80 
FRS3 20 32 0.76 0.20 0.13 1.00 0.80 
FRS119 21 100 0.73 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.78 
FRS117 19 83 0.73 0.20 0.25 1.00 0.75 
FRS136 39 72 0.71 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.75 
Panel C: Non-family firms (i.e., FamContF = 0) (N=121) 
FRS101 69 121 0.96 0.03 0.88 1.00 0.97 
FRS5 12 46 0.96 0.11 0.67 1.00 1.00 
FRS116 15 121 0.94 0.10 0.54 1.00 1.00 
FRS114 20 90 0.93 0.16 0.00 1.00 1.00 
FRS132 34 119 0.90 0.12 0.30 1.00 0.92 
FRS2 12 45 0.82 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.88 
FRS138 14 58 0.81 0.21 0.29 1.00 0.83 
FRS140 20 59 0.78 0.14 0.40 1.00 0.83 
FRS3 20 40 0.78 0.17 0.50 1.00 0.80 
FRS119 21 121 0.77 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.80 
FRS117 19 100 0.75 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.75 
FRS136 39 81 0.74 0.21 0.11 1.00 0.80 
NS: Number of items per standard (Total: 295); NT: Number of times the standard is applicable; FRS101 
Presentation of Financial Statements; FRS5 Non-current assets held for sale and Discontinued Operations; 
FRS116 Property, Plant and Equipment; FRS114 Segmental Reporting; FRS 132 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure and Presentation; FRS2 Share Based Payment; FRS 138 Intangible Assets; FRS 140 Investment 
Property; FRS3 Business Combinations; FRS119 Employee Benefits; FRS117 Leases; and FRS 136 Impairment 
of Assets. Family firms are firms with two or more family members on the board (Jaggi et al., 2009 - see section 
for 4.2 for relevant discussion). None of the differences between means and medians across the two sub-samples 
are statistically significant. 
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TABLE 6: Determinants of IFRS mandatory disclosure levels (Full sample) 
Variables 
PC Method Cooke’s Method 
Actual score Log of the Odds Actual Score Log of the Odds 
Intercept 0.902*** 2.467*** 0.943*** 2.495*** 
Family  -0.094*** -0.668*** -0.033** -0.285* 
Ind_dir -0.047 -0.446 -0.011 -0.058 
BS 0.001 0.008 0.001* -0.001 
ACEx -0.023 -0.252 0.011 0.130 
ACS -0.009 -0.066 -0.014*** -0.096** 
ACM 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.023 
BEx -0.103*** -0.904*** -0.076*** -0.742*** 
BM 0.005** 0.057*** 0.004** 0.044** 
Ind_dir_AC 0.086*** 0.572** 0.044** 0.387* 
DUAL 0.001 -0.021 0.002 0.013 
Industry -0.004 -0.038 -0.002 -0.060 
Aud -0.004 0.000 0.010 0.079 
ROE 0.053*** 0.381*** 0.026 0.179 
Liq -0.001 -0.008 0.000 0.000 
Size -0.004 -0.051* -0.003 -0.026 
Lev 0.001 0.012 0.002 0.019 
Adj. R2 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.14 
F 4.59*** 4.33*** 3.58*** 3.01*** 
N 208 209 208 209 
Max VIF 1.94 1.90 1.93 1.98 
Mean VIF 1.42 1.42 1.44 1.44 
 
Definitions for all variables are provided in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Reported results are for regressions 
excluding observations with |Cook’s Distance| > (4 divided by the number of sample firms in each regression). 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7: Determinants of IFRS mandatory disclosure levels. (Family versus Non-Family firms) 
Variables 
Family firms Non-Family firms  
PC Method Cooke’s Method PC Method Cooke’s Method 
Actual score Log of the Odds Actual score Log of the Odds Actual score Log of the Odds Actual score Log of the Odds 
Intercept 0.8416*** 1.3635 0.9225*** 2.3459 0.9008*** 2.3389*** 0.9483 2.7057 
Ind_dir 0.0054 0.5147 0.0303 0.1130 -0.0228 -0.3369 0.0137 0.1564 
BS 0.0023 0.0368 0.0013 0.0134 -0.0004 -0.0055 -0.0002 0.0059 
ACEx -0.0337 -0.5651* -0.0189 -0.2310 -0.0324 -0.3840 -0.0011 -0.0480 
ACS -0.0255** -0.2623** -0.0234*** -0.2516*** -0.0042 -0.0188 -0.0077 -0.0660 
ACM -0.0025 -0.0421 -0.0069 -0.0717 -0.0012 -0.0080 -0.0023 -0.0216 
BEx -0.0333 -0.2000 -0.0452 -0.4121 -0.1298*** -1.1498*** -0.0808** -0.7086* 
BM 0.0097* 0.0974* 0.0082** 0.0891** 0.0053** 0.0529** 0.0053*** 0.0472** 
Ind_dir_AC 0.1178** 0.8878** 0.0611* 0.6907** 0.0178 0.2308 0.0148 0.0551 
DUAL 0.0176 0.2454 0.0131 0.1447 -0.0077 -0.0528 -0.0055 -0.0821 
Industry -0.0048 0.0062 0.0013 0.0103 -0.0133 -0.1103 -0.0169* -0.1577* 
Aud 0.0044 0.1089 0.0237** 0.1884* -0.0090 -0.0170 -0.0071 -0.0842 
ROE 0.0293 0.2021 0.0218 0.1868 0.0500* 0.4443* 0.0444* 0.3727* 
Liq -0.0027** -0.0238** 0.0003 0.0037 -0.0004 0.0035 0.0001 0.0024 
Size -0.0037 -0.0105 -0.0037 -0.0207 0.0000 -0.0183 -0.0034 -0.0317 
Lev -0.0046 -0.0012 -0.0004 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0030 0.0045 0.0419 
Adj. R2 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.16 
F 2.54*** 2.23** 3.12*** 3.05*** 2.82*** 2.86*** 1.79** 1.93** 
N 92 95 96 97 113 113 113 113 
Max VIF 3.04 3.13 2.67 2.77 1.92 1.91 1.92 1.92 
Mean VIF 1.81 1.80 1.75 1.75 1.46 1.48 1.47 1.47 
 
Definitions for all variables are provided in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Family firms are firms with two or more family members on the board (Jaggi et al., 2009 - see section for 4.2 for relevant 
discussion). Reported results are for regressions excluding observations with |Cook’s Distance| > (4 divided by the number of sample firms in each regression). ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8: Firm value and IFRS mandatory disclosure levels  
Panel A: Tobin’s Q 
Variables 
PC Method Cooke’s Method 
Actual score Log of the Odds Actual score Log of the Odds 
Intercept -0.044 0.155 -0.228 0.105 
CS  0.303 0.030 0.489 0.046 
Industry 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 
ROE 2.100*** 2.101*** 2.109*** 2.106*** 
Liq 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
Size 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
Lev 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 
Growth -0.115 -0.114 -0.117* -0.116* 
FamContF -0.139** -0.140** -0.141** -0.140** 
OthOwn 0.471*** 0.470*** 0.475*** 0.473*** 
Adj. R2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
F 8.85*** 8.87*** 8.87*** 9.05*** 
N 210 210 210 210 
Max VIF 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 
Mean VIF 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.15 
Panel B: MTB 
Variables 
PC Method Cooke’s Method 
Actual score Log of the Odds Actual score Log of the Odds 
Intercept 0.004 0.068 -1.117 -0.268 
CS  -0.049 -0.048 0.683 0.013 
Industry -0.155 -0.158 -0.151 -0.126 
ROE 3.945*** 3.962*** 3.757*** 3.836*** 
Liq 0.017* 0.017 0.024** 0.018* 
Size 0.054 0.053 0.087** 0.065* 
Lev 0.151 0.149 0.186** 0.170* 
Growth 0.113 0.111 0.209 -0.003 
FamContF -0.351*** -0.355*** -0.309** -0.298** 
OthOwn 0.550** 0.550** 0.595** 0.601** 
Adj. R2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.40 
F 7.21*** 7.22*** 6.66*** 7.25*** 
N 205 205 208 204 
Max VIF 1.37 1.37 1.34 1.38 
Mean VIF 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.19 
 
Definitions for all variables are provided in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Reported results are for regressions 
excluding observations with |Cook’s Distance| > (4 divided by the number of sample firms in each regression). 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
